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Executive Summary 
• Russia’s strategic culture has been primarily shaped by its troubled relationship with Europe 
and the West, but relations with Asia have also had a profound impact on Russian strategic 
thought. Historically, attempts to reorient Russian policy toward Asia have often sought to 
compensate for worsening relations with the West, but have frequently ended in failure.  
 
• President Putin’s current “Pivot to the East” has had important successes, but has failed to 
resolve a long-term strategic challenge for Russia: how to manage its relations with China 
without becoming a junior, dependent partner. 
 
• In response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which threaten to dominate the Eurasian 
continent, Russia has proposed a “Greater Eurasian Partnership,” which promotes a Russian-
led vision of Eurasian integration, in cooperation with a rising China.  
 
• The “Greater Eurasia” idea has little economic or institutional backing, and exists largely at a 
rhetorical level. Moreover, it reproduces many of the historical challenges of Russia’s Asia 
policy: it is still largely informed by Russia’s problematic relations with the West, promoting 
Greater Eurasia as an emerging anti-Western bloc. It highlights important differences with 
China’s vision for a new Eurasian order.  
 
• Critics of the “Greater Eurasia” project argue that Russia should avoid dependence on China 
by maintaining an “equidistant” position between East and West, a strategic turn dubbed 
“geopolitical loneliness.”  
 
Russia and Asia: A Troubled History 
Putin’s “Pivot to the East,” announced during his 2012 election campaign, is far from Russia’s 
first attempt to reorient its foreign policy toward Asia. Historically, Russia’s strategic culture has 
been shaped by the tension between its relationship with Europe and numerous attempts to 
 
 
balance its European orientation with new initiatives in Asia.1 At the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk, 
Russia became the first European country to sign a treaty with China, as the Russian state opened 
up new trade routes through Siberia. Its later expansion was less peaceful: The Tsarist empire 
seized more than 665,000 square miles of territory from China in Siberia, Central Asia, and the 
Far East between 1858 and 1864.2 In the 1890s, the construction of the Trans-Siberian railway 
opened up the Russian Far East to settlement, trade, and military deployment, but also involved 
Russia more deeply in East Asian geopolitics. Yet this late Tsarist “pivot” to Asia ended in 
ignominy, in the first defeat of a major European power by an Asian state in the Russo-Japanese 
war of 1905.  
 
After 1917, the Soviets also turned to the East, disappointed by the failure of the European 
working class to rise in support of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia. “Let us turn our faces 
towards Asia,” said Lenin, aiming to “set the East ablaze” in revolution.3 The attempt to export 
revolution was largely a failure, and Stalin refocused attention on the domestic front, with his 
“socialism in one country” policy, which sought to strengthen socialism within the Soviet Union. 
In the 1940s, however, Stalin played a major role in the Chinese Communist Party’s victory, and 
the two Communist states forged a seemingly invincible alliance in the early 1950s. Yet in the 
1960s, this pivot also collapsed over ideological differences and competition for leadership of the 
Communist movement. I in 1969 the two states almost went to war with each other over a border 
dispute. Good relations were not restored until the 1980s, when a speech in 1986 by Mikhail 
Gorbachev set out a vision for a new Soviet policy towards East Asia. Moscow’s lack of 
commitment and internal turmoil led to the collapse of this initiative within a few years, and with 
it the Soviet state.4 
 
Post-Soviet Russia followed similar pattern of oscillations between enthusiasm and indifference 
in its policy toward its eastern neighbors. Relations with China, South Korea, and Japan all 
improved markedly in the 1990s, but the dispute over ownership of the Russian-controlled Kurile 
Islands ensured that a long-awaited breakthrough in relations with Japan did not occur. Instead, 
Russia’s policy in East Asia became increasingly dominated by its bilateral ties with China. 
China and Russia became “strategic partners” in 1996, in accordance with then-foreign minister 
Yevgeny Primakov’s commitment to a more balanced Russian foreign policy. In 2001, Russia 
signed a Treaty of Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation with China, and 
longstanding border disputes were resolved in 2005. Progress on trade and economic integration 
was slower—China was more interested in close ties with the United States, and Russia was 
cautious about Chinese investment in strategic sectors.  
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Russia’s latest “pivot to the East” began with a rhetorical flourish at the beginning of Vladimir 
Putin’s third presidential term (2012–2018).5 It was accelerated by the downturn in relations with 
the West after Russia’s annexation of the Crimean peninsula from Ukrainian control in March 
2014. This new policy orientation promised new initiatives in three key directions: more 
economic development in Russia’s Far Eastern regions, reviving ties with former Soviet 
republics through Eurasian integration, and forging a closer political alignment with China and 
East Asian countries.  
 
The domestic agenda - development in the Russian Far East - has been the least successful of 
these initiatives. In December 2013, Putin declared that “Russia’s reorientation toward the 
Pacific Ocean and the dynamic development in all our eastern territories are our priority for the 
whole 21st century.”6 In reality, political, economic, and cultural life remains centered in 
Moscow. A highly centralized political and fiscal system actively discourages local and regional 
initiatives. Business and taxes flow into the center, rather than remaining in the regions, and 
government spending reflects this centralization. According to one source, as much as 70 percent 
of transport construction in Russia happens within 50 kilometers of Moscow.7 One critic, Viktor 
Larin, argues that whatever new slogans about an eastern “pivot” are dreamed up in Moscow, 
“on the shores of the Pacific Ocean they are increasingly received as just another experiment of 
Kremlin dreamers.”8 
 
The second goal, Eurasian integration, has also faced challenges. The Eurasian Economic Union 
(EAEU) began functioning in 2015 as a customs union consisting of the Kyrgyz Republic, 
Kazakhstan, Armenia, Russia and Belarus. Efforts to convince Ukraine to join the bloc ended in 
political turmoil and conflict. The remaining members of the EAEU have been embroiled in 
trade wars and disagreements over sanctions regimes. Other states show little inclination to join. 
Even one of the strongest backers of Eurasian integration, Sergei Karaganov, a professor and 
dean at Moscow’s Higher School of Economics, admits that there is “no sense of success in 
societies or in elites,” and instead the EAEU faces a “flood of criticism.”9 The EAEU should not 
be written off: its capacity to set external tariffs on goods from China and elsewhere entering the 
EAEU does strengthen Russia’s influence in Central Asia, but it is primarily a geopolitical, not 
an economic initiative. 
 
The third goal of the pivot - Russia’s growing relationship with China - has been more 
successful. Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping have presided over a sharp upturn in ties, partly based 
on a strong personal relationship between the two leaders. Chinese investment in Russia has been 
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disappointing, but trade has still boomed to $108 billion in 2018 up from just $21 billion in 2005. 
The two sides are forming a strategic energy partnership: Russia is now China’s biggest source 
of crude oil, China has invested in two major LNG plants in the Russian Arctic, and the Power of 
Siberia pipeline delivering Russian gas to China will come on stream later this year.10 China also 
remains a key market for Russian arms sales. Russia has sold China some of its most advanced 
equipment, including SU-35 fighter jets and S-400 surface-to-air missile systems.11 Some 
experts suggest Russia has a short window—a decade or less—before China’s domestic arms 
industry develops a similar level of technological innovation and Russia begins to lose out to 
China’s domestic producers.12 Direct military ties are also growing: at the Vostok military 
exercises in September 2018 in the Russian Eastern Military District, a 3,500-strong contingent 
from the People’s Liberation Army participated for the first time.13  
 
Perhaps most significant is the close diplomatic relationship between the two countries. At the 
United Nations and in other bodies, Russia and China do not always agree, but they never oppose 
each other in public. Often their diplomats work together to shape debates and influence 
outcomes. They are no longer only rule-takers, but are beginning to shape international norms 
and structures of global governance, promoting the principle of state sovereignty and 
downplaying such liberal norms as human rights, the responsibility to protect, or democracy 
promotion.  
 
Yet Russia continues to struggle to find a workable framework within which it can manage 
China’s rise. Despite Russia’s close relationship with Beijing, it has been cautious about China’s 
multilateral initiatives and nervous about China’s expansion into its sphere of influence. Russia 
effectively blocked efforts to turn the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) into an 
economic club or free trade zone, which would have strengthened China’s influence in Central 
Asia. When China announced the formation of the Asian International Investment Bank (AIIB) 
in 2014, Russia initially balked at joining.14 Despite President Putin’s star role at successive 
conferences on the Belt and Road Initiative in Beijing, Russia has still not agreed to membership 
in the BRI. As China continues to rise, Russia’s international role remains limited by its 
underwhelming economic growth, and it risks ending up in a difficult position as China’s junior 
partner.  
 
                                                          
10 The most comprehensive account of this relationship is Erica Downs, James Henderson, Mikkal E. Herberg, 
Shoichi Itoh, Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Morena Skalamera, and Can Soylu, The Emerging Russia-Asia Energy Nexus, 
National Bureau of Asian Research, December 2018, https://www.nbr.org/wp-
content/uploads/pdfs/publications/special_report_74_emerging_russia-asia_energy_nexus_dec2018.pdf. 
11Franz-Stefan Gady, “Russia Confirms Delivery of 10 Su-35 Fighter Jets to China by Year’s End,” The Diplomat, 
29 August 2018; Franz-Stefan Gady, “China’s Military Accepts First S-400 Missile Air Defense Regiment From 
Russia,” The Diplomat, July 26, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/chinas-military-accepts-first-s-400-missile-
air-defense-regiment-from-russia/. 
12 Alexander Gabuev, “Why Russia and China Are Strengthening Security Ties,” Foreign Affairs, September 24, 
2018. 
13 See Michael J. Green, “Should America Fear a New Sino-Russian Alliance,” Foreign Policy, August 13, 2014; 
Mathieu Boulègue, “Russia's Vostok Exercises Were Both Serious Planning and a Show,” Chatham House, 
September 17, 2018. 
14Alexander Gabuev, “Russia Joins the AIIB ... Finally,” The Moscow Times, April 1, 2015, 
https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2015/04/01/russia-joins-the-aiib-finally-a45354. 
 
 
Greater Eurasia 
Since the 19th century, Russia had been the dominant partner in relations with China, but now it 
is increasingly the other way round. Geographic frameworks within Russia’s strategic culture 
have struggled to accommodate this new reality of a rising China. The idea of a “Russian 
World,” which came to prominence in 2013-14, viewed Russia as the center of a Russian-
speaking sphere of influence, but had nothing to say about its relations with Asia. There was 
more potential in the idea of Eurasia, a movement that rejected Russia’s European heritage and 
asserted an alternative identity and geopolitical destiny in the East.  
 
The original Eurasianist movement, founded in the 1920s by Russian intellectuals in exile, used 
the term “Eurasia” to describe the vast geographical expanse stretching from Eastern Europe to 
the borders of the Chinese empire.15 The idea of Russia as a great power at the heart of this 
world in between Europe and Asia has been highly influential in post-Soviet Russian strategic 
thinking. Yet Eurasianism failed to offer a clear strategic answer to the challenge of a rising 
China. In traditional Eurasianist thinking, Eurasia was a civilizational and geopolitical bloc 
sharply distinguished from - and often opposed to - the Confucian-Buddhist civilizational space 
of China.16 Many Eurasianist ideas reinforced traditional Russian suspicions of China, views 
which had been intensified during the Sino-Soviet split.  
 
In the mid-2010s, foreign policy thinkers in Moscow tried to address this challenge with a novel 
concept of “Greater Eurasia,” an idea described as Russia’s first genuine strategic concept since 
the end of the Soviet Union.17 It first emerged in 2015 among a group of Russian foreign policy 
thinkers in the pro-Kremlin Valdai Club, led by Sergei Karaganov, Timofey Bordachev and 
other scholars. Karaganov and his colleagues argued that the idea of a “China threat” was an 
invented notion from the Soviet period, encouraged in later years by the United States. Instead, 
China should be a key ally for Russia in the development of a new “greater Eurasian 
community.” Russia should embrace new Chinese investment in transport and other 
infrastructure projects, using the Belt and Road Initiative as a way of shifting the focus of 
Russia’s development from the European part of Russia to Siberia and the Far East.  
 
The term quickly gained traction in official circles. Sergei Naryshkin – then Speaker of the State 
Duma - began talking of a “Greater Eurasia” stretching from Murmansk to Shanghai.18 In June 
2016, Putin used the term in a discussion at the plenary session of the Petersburg International 
Economic Forum, talking about “the creation of a greater Eurasian partnership with the 
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participation of the Eurasian Economic Community, and also countries, with which we have 
close relations: China, India, Pakistan, and Iran.”19 At the May 2017 International Forum, “One-
Belt, One-Road” in Beijing, Putin argued that “One Belt, One Road, the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, the Association of South East Asian Nations [ASEAN], are capable of becoming 
the basis for the formation of a Greater Eurasian partnership.”20 He returned to the idea at the 
2019 Belt and Road Initiative meeting, claiming that the “the PRC president’s Belt and Road 
initiative echoes the Russian idea of creating a Greater Eurasian Partnership,” which would 
involve an “integration of integrations” or “a close linking of various ongoing bilateral and 
multilateral integration processes in Eurasia. 21 
 
In diplomatic statements, Greater Eurasia has become a useful framing device, in which Russia is 
portrayed as an equal partner with China, and the Belt and Road Initiative and the EAEU are 
presented as integration projects of equivalent significance, but diplomatic rhetoric can hardly 
disguise the growing divide between China’s $13.6 trillion dollar economy and Russia’s GDP of 
just $1.7 trillion. Perhaps more significant is the argument from proponents of the Greater 
Eurasia idea that China can best be managed within a multilateral framework, and that a wider 
Greater Eurasian Partnership—which might include Russia, India, and China, along with the 
ASEAN countries—could reduce some of the potential frictions caused by China’s rapid rise in 
the Eurasian region. In this geopolitical geometry, China might be the economic leader, but not a 
hegemon, because within a loose Greater Eurasian partnership “Beijing will be balanced by 
Moscow, Delhi, Tokyo, Seoul, Teheran, Jakarta and Manila.”22 Russia might not be able to 
complete economically, but would play an indispensable role as the primary security actor across 
Eurasia, securing China’s transport routes and strategic flanks in Central Asia, the Middle East 
and the Arctic. Yefremenko argues that, within Greater Eurasia, Russia could play the role of 
“sheriff,” having proved itself so effectively in Syria.23 Such views are met with skepticism in 
China, which has its own growing security footprint across Eurasia. 
 
The ideological aspects of the project may also cause concern in Beijing. For most of its 
advocates, an exact geography of Greater Eurasia is less important than ideational aspects. Space 
is important, writes Yefremenko, but Greater Eurasia is also an ideological alternative to the 
form of liberal globalization that stalled during the 2008 financial crisis.24 Yefremenko does not 
espouse a “formal military-political alliance against the USA,” but argues that “China and Russia 
will act in solidarity in the deconstruction of the American-centric world order and the 
construction of a more just and secure system of international relations in Eurasia and in the 
world.”25 At a trilateral meeting of heads of state of India, Russia, and China in Osaka in June  
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2019, President Xi commented that the three states should promote “a more multipolar world and 
the democratization of international relations,”26 shorthand for challenging what is viewed as a 
U.S.-dominated international order.   
 
Yet, despite this kind of rhetoric and growing tensions with the United States, China remains 
cautious about any radical revisionism. Foreign Minister Wang Yi recently stated, “we must 
observe and preserve the existing order. China cannot and will not start a new order.”27 
Economically, China has much more at stake in the current international order than does Russia, 
and is unlikely to welcome Russian strategic talk of an emerging bipolar order between a 
transatlantic bloc led by the United States and a loose configuration, led by Russia and China, in 
Greater Eurasia.28  
 
The idea of Greater Eurasia as a Sino-Russian challenge to U.S. hegemony is also viewed as 
dangerously confrontational by more mainstream foreign policy thinkers in Moscow. Dmitry 
Trenin, Director of the Carnegie Center in Moscow, has argued, “Russia's mission is not to 
change the world order, or overthrow the U.S. from the position of leading global power.” Above 
all, Greater Eurasia should not be a platform to form “a kind of anti-American alliance with 
China.” Instead, Russia should maintain a balanced foreign policy, avoiding dependence either 
on China or on Europe. Such a policy, Trenin believes, will lead to a kind of “geopolitical 
loneliness” for Russia. This need not be wholly negative: without the entanglements of alliances 
and even alignments, Russia would be free to exercise its sovereignty and achieve a rare status in 
international politics—the capacity to be free.29  
 
In a 2018 article, Kremlin ideologue Vladislav Surkov had also predicted “a hundred years (or 
possibly two hundred or three hundred) of geopolitical loneliness,” in which Russia—
characterized by “double-headed statehood, hybrid mentality, intercontinental territory and 
bipolar history,” would be allied only with itself.30 Surkov argues that the shift to “geopolitical 
loneliness” marks a sharp break with Russia’s Eurocentric strategic orientation of the past 400 
years. This “lonely” Russia would end its constant oscillation between East and West and its 
attempts to resolve Russia’s geopolitical dilemmas through new spatial projects. 
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This idea is also not new. Geopolitical isolationism also has an important place in Russian 
strategic culture: the apocryphal words of Alexander III, that “Russia has only two allies: its 
army and navy,” continue to have more resonance in Russian strategic thinking than such grand 
visions as Greater Eurasia. Yet this kind of self-isolation offers little to Russia in terms of 
meeting the challenges of a complex and interdependent world. To successfully balance its 
relations with China and other East Asian states and begin to resolve its difficult relations with 
the West, Russia needs more far-reaching strategic innovation that goes beyond the slogans of 
the “Eastern Pivot” and “Greater Eurasia.”  
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